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In the present study we test the hypothesis that the effect of mood congruence 
in autobiographical recall is underlain by mood. Thirty-eight female participants were 
subjected to positive, negative and neutral mood inductions, and then asked to recall three 
personal memories. Participants’ mood was assessed using self-report questionnaires and by 
electromyograph (EMG) measurements of corrugator supercilii and zygomaticus major muscle 
activity. We replicated the congruence effect between the mood inductions and the valence 
of the participants’ recalled memories. Furthermore, this effect was mediated by mood, as 
measured by EMG and self-report questionnaires. The results suggest that mood influences the 
mood congruence effect in a way that cannot be explained by semantic priming alone.
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Many studies have shown that when a subject is asked to recall autobiographical 
memories, the affective valence of the recalled memories is congruent with the 
subject’s mood (for a review, see Blaney, 1986). For instance, Snyder and White 
(1982) observed that participants who were exposed to a positive mood induction 
tended to recall happy personal experiences (e.g., getting a good grade), whereas 
those exposed to a negative mood induction recalled fewer happy and more 
unpleasant personal experiences (e.g., break up of a romantic relationship). Although 
the mood congruence effect has been observed in a large number of studies, the 
role of mood in this phenomenon remains uncertain. Some authors have gone as far 
as proposing purely cognitive explanations for the mood congruence effect, thereby 
denying that affective state has any influence at all. The present study was designed 
to determine whether or not mood plays a role in the mood congruence effect.
Affective explanations of mood congruence
Bower’s (1981) associative network theory provides an attractive 
explanation for the mood congruence effect. According to this theory, 
emotions form nodes that are organized into memory networks containing 
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information that shares the same valence. When an emotion node is activated by 
emotional information in the environment (e.g., a mood induction procedure), 
congruent thoughts in memory are activated and thus become more accessible. 
Consequently, negative memories come to mind more easily when individuals 
are in a negative mood and positive memories come to mind more easily when 
individuals are in a positive mood. Another explanation of the mood congruence 
effect is drawn from the affect-as-information model (Schwarz, 2001; Schwarz 
& Clore, 1983). According to this approach, people use their momentary feeling 
states as diagnostic information for making evaluative judgments about a specific 
object. For example, when asked to recall an autobiographical memory related to 
a specific period in one’s life, people’s initial reactions are evaluative in that they 
ask themselves the question: “What was my life like at that time?” This would 
be affected by current mood. As a result, people who are in a good mood will 
make more positively biased assessments of the life period in question whereas 
people who are in a bad mood will make more negatively biased assessments. 
This general appraisal will then cue the search for relevant autobiographical 
episodes, so that the recall is more likely to be mood congruent.
Cognitive Explanations of Mood Congruence
Although Bower’s and Schwarz’s explanations are divergent about the 
mediating mechanisms involved (mood as information versus mood as primer), 
they both suppose that the subject’s affective state is the factor causing the 
mood congruence. An alternative explanation that is frequently proposed in the 
literature questions the reliability of affect-based explanations. According to this 
explanation, the mood congruence effect can be explained by semantic priming. 
Some authors argue that the mood-inducing situation also carries semantic content 
that can directly prime similar cognitions and material in memory (e.g., Blaney, 
1986; Rholes, Riskind, & Lane, 1987). Subsequently, the cognitions activated 
by the situation can semantically prepare or guide cognitive processes such as 
recalling autobiographical episodes. As a result, the mood congruency observed 
in the literature can be seen as a form of the classic semantic priming effect 
(Higgins & King, 1980), which is independent of an individual’s affective state. 
From a theoretical point of view, the affective and cognitive explanations of mood 
congruency are not incompatible. Nevertheless, if mood congruence is solely due 
to cognitive effects, studying mood congruency would not further delve into the 
relation between emotions and cognitions (Ehrlichman & Halpren, 1988).
Is Mood involved?
When addressing this question, researchers have usually tried to isolate 
the influence of mood by selecting mood induction procedures that are supposed 
not to activate semantic concepts that are congruent with the material to be 
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this type often produce contradictory findings, with some concluding that the 
mood congruence effect is not caused by an individual’s affective state (Mayer, 
Gayle, Meehan, & Haarman, 1990; Rholes   et al.  , 1987; Riskind, 1983; Riskind, 
Rholes, & Eggers, 1982), and others suggesting the opposite (Ehrlichman & 
Halpren, 1988; Kumari, Hemsley, Cotter, Checkley, & Grey, 1998; Schnall 
& Laird, 2003). Second, the methodology used in this type of study does not 
allow us to confirm the validity of the affective hypothesis. In fact, even more 
naturalistic mood-induction procedures, which are supposed to be semantically 
unintrusive, can incidentally activate cognitions whose effect could be mistaken 
for the effect of mood. Ehrlichman and Halpren (1988) highlighted this point 
in a study that used pleasant vs. unpleasant odors to manipulate mood: “it is 
also possible that the odors did produce an experience that involved at least 
some degree of self-reference. That is, in response to, say, an unpleasant odor, 
a person’s phenomenology could be characterized [...] as “I feel disgusted.” As 
the latter response focuses on the person [...], it could conceivably call forth 
self-schemata and elaborated cognitive structures that could then bias retrieval” 
(p. 777). Despite much research into the subject, the debate over the role of 
mood has not been satisfactorily resolved (see Wyer, Clore, & Isbell, 1999).
THE PRESENT STUDY
The question of whether the mood congruence effect is a consequence 
of an individual’s affective state or a result of semantic priming remains to 
be answered. As stated above, the roles of these two mechanisms cannot be 
distinguished using mood induction procedures (Ehrlichman & Halpren, 1988); 
therefore, other methods must be developed if we are to determine the influence 
of affect. In the present study we propose to identify the role of mood using a 
mediation analysis. If, as we think, mood is involved in the mood congruence 
effect, it should be possible to measure it after the induction procedure, and to test 
a mediation hypothesis: the induction procedure should impact the mood which 
should in turn influence memory recall. Participants were subjected to a mood 
induction procedure in order to activate a positive, neutral or negative mood, 
and then they were asked to recall three autobiographical memories. Self-report 
questionnaires and physiological measures were used to assess each participant’s 
affective state during the experiment. In line with the results of previous studies, 
we expected the valence of the recalled memories to be congruent with the 
induced mood. Based on the assumption that affective state plays a role in the 
mood congruence effect, we hypothesized that mood mediates the main effect of 
the mood induction on the valence of the autobiographical recall.
Method
Participants. Participants were 38 female psychology undergraduates (M age = 21.4, SD = 
5.85) from the University of Savoie. By taking part in the experiment, the participants fulfilled 
a research participation course requirement. As there were many more female psychology 
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recruitment and to avoid variability in our physiological measures caused by gender-specific 
differences in facial expressions (facial expressions are strongly related to socially induced 
gender roles, e.g., display rules, Ekman, 1993).
Mood induction procedure. We developed a combined mood induction procedure (MIP; Drace, 
Desrichard, Shepperd & Hoorens, 2009; Drace, Ric & Desrichard, 2010) that simultaneously 
associated two non-verbal MIPs: a “Musical MIP” (e.g., Niedenthal & Setterlund, 1994) and 
a “Pictorial MIP” (e.g., Bradley, Cuthbert, & Lang, 1996). During a period of 10 minutes, 
participants were asked to look at a series of pictures while listening to music. We selected 
pictures from the International Affective Picture System (IAPS; Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 
1995). Pretesting, in which participants rated a set of IAPS items (1 = negative; 9 = positive), 
was used to select 26 pictures for the negative mood condition (M = 2.3, SD = 0.37, Range 
1.8 to 3.2), 26 pictures for the neutral mood condition (M = 5.0, SD = 0.26, Range 4.6 to 5.3) 
and 26 pictures for the positive mood condition (M = 7.3, SD = 0.32, Range 6.7 to 8.1)1. The 
negative mood pictures depicted among others scenes: traffic and plane accidents, cemeteries, 
a drug addict, crying children and ecological disaster. The positive mood pictures depicted 
among others scenes: babies, animals, landscapes, family idylls, couples, athletes involved in 
sports. The neutral mood pictures depicted among others scenes: affectively neutral human 
faces, furniture, utensils and abstract art. The music was drawn from selections used in prior 
mood research (Niedenthal, Halberstadt, & Setterlund, 1997; Niedenthal & Setterlund, 1994). 
Participants in the positive mood condition listened to selections from Mozart’s Eine Kleine 
Nachtmusik and Divertimento #136, and from Vivaldi’s Mandolin Concertos. Participants in 
the neutral mood condition listened to selections from Brahm’s Symphony No. 1 in C Minor. 
Participants in the negative mood condition listened to selections from Mahler’s Adagietto.
Measures. 
BMIS.  Participants’ mood was assessed using the Brief Mood Introspection Scale 
(BMIS; Mayer & Gaschke, 1988). The BMIS consists of 16 items pertaining to affective 
states (e.g., sad, happy, lively, gloomy, etc.). Participants had to rate, on a 4-point scale, the 
extent to which she felt each state at “that moment”. A BMIS score was calculated for each 
participant by subtracting the sum of the scores obtained for negative items (α = .73) from the 
sum obtained for positive items (α = .78). The higher a participant’s BMIS score, the more 
positive her mood.
EMG. Prior work has shown that the electromyographic (EMG) activity of the 
corrugator supercilii and zygomaticus major muscles is a highly reliable indicator of both 
the valence and the intensity of a person’s affective state (Cacioppo, Petty, Losch, & Kim, 
1986). The corrugator supercilii muscles are involved in frowning, which is symptomatic of 
individuals’ facial expressions when they are in a negative mood, and the zygomaticus major 
muscles are involved in smiling, which typically indicates a positive mood. The EMG activities 
of the corrugator supercilii and zygomaticus major muscles were recorded via four “EL 503” 
electrodes (Biopac Systems, Inc., Santa Barbara, CA). In order to optimize signal quality, the 
electrodes were attached following the recommendations of Fridlund and Cacioppo (1986). 
Data was recorded using a Biopac Lab PRO System. The amplified (x5) signals were digitized 
at a frequency of 1000 HZ and displayed on the screen as continuous lines. We only retained 
recordings for periods during which the participants were not looking at any pictures (i.e., a 
5-second period between each picture and a 40-second period following the end of the mood 
1  The following pictures were used for the mood inductions. Positive mood: 1460, 1463, 
1610, 1710, 1721, 1750, 2057, 2070, 2080, 2091, 2165, 2304, 2311, 2340, 2341, 2345, 
2360, 2530, 2550, 2660, 5779, 5780, 5982, 7580, 8370, 8420. Negative mood: 2205, 2710, 
2750, 2900, 3180, 3220, 6212, 6213, 6530, 6550, 6570, 9000, 9041, 9050, 9220, 9280, 
9415, 9421, 9520, 9560, 9611, 9630, 9830, 9910, 9911, 9920. Neutral mood: 2190, 2385, 
2514, 2516, 2749, 2840, 2890, 5510, 5531, 5534, 7004, 7006, 7009, 7010, 7020, 7050, 
7160, 7170, 7175, 7185, 7187, 7207, 7211, 7217, 7233, 7235.Saša Drače and Olivier Desrichard 221
induction procedure). There were two main reasons for this decision. First, IAPS pictures 
have been shown to trigger facial reactions that cause variations in corrugator supercilii and 
zygomaticus major EMG activity (Bradley et al., 1996; Lan  , Greenwald, Bradley, & Hamm 
1993), so it is impossible to know whether EMG activity during picture presentation is due 
to facial reactions to pleasant vs. unpleasant pictorial stimuli or to the general affective state 
of the participant. Second, reactions recorded during the picture presentation stage may also 
be the result of mimicry, as some pictures showed people’s faces expressing joy and sadness 
(Hatfield, Cacioppo, & Rapson, 1994).
Physiological indicators of mood were obtained for each participant by calculating the 
average amplitude of the EMG signals produced by corrugator supercilii and zygomaticus 
major activity. Subsequent correlation analysis revealed good convergent validity between 
the corrugator supercilii and zygomaticus major EMG activities and the BMIS scores 
(respectively, r = –.44 vs. .43, p <.05).
Valence of memories. Five independent judges, who were blind to the hypotheses and to the 
participants’ mood induction conditions, rated the memories on a 7-point scale (1= very negative; 
7 = very positive). As the consistency between judges was very high (αs = .98, .97, .96), we 
calculated a valence score for each memory by averaging the evaluations of the five judges.
Procedure. Participants took part individually. Each participant was randomly assigned to 
one of three mood induction conditions. In order to avoid experimenter demand bias, the 
instructions were designed to minimize the extent to which participants could infer that we 
were actually interested in mood or in the relationship between mood and autobiographical 
recall. In order to disguise the purpose of the research, the experimenter described the study as 
examining eyewitness testimony. Participants were told that the experiment would have three 
stages. Stage one involved viewing a series of pictures (viewing stage), which the participants 
were asked to look at very carefully, as they would be tested on what they had seen at 
the end of the experiment. Stage two consisted of a set of distraction tasks in which the 
participants were asked to complete questionnaires (distraction stage), ostensibly to simulate 
real eyewitness report situations, in which there is a time delay between seeing an event and 
describing it, during which a witness’s attention is diverted by other stimuli. In stage three, 
the participants were asked to answer questions about the pictures (identification stage). The 
participants were told that the music they would be listening to throughout the experiment 
was designed to isolate them from environmental noises and to facilitate concentration on the 
pictures. The experimenter justified the presence of the EMG electrodes by explaining that 
the experiment required the measurement of skin conductivity during the viewing stage. At no 
time were the participants informed that the experimenter was interested in facial expressions.
When a participant had understood the procedure and been fitted with the EMG 
electrodes, she put on the headphones and the mood induction procedure began. Participants 
were shown each of the pictures for their condition for 15 seconds, with a gap of 5 seconds 
between pictures, during which time the screen was black.
After the mood induction, the experimenter reminded participants that before the 
identification stage they had to perform a distractive cognitive task. They were first asked 
to fill in a BMIS, and then they were given a sheet of paper bearing the instructions: “Try 
to remember three events that happened to you during the previous school year. Write down 
a brief description of these memories in the order they occur to you. Your responses will be 
kept strictly confidential”. We asked about the previous school year in particular to make 
the task relevant to the students and to reduce the qualitative variability of the memories 
that participants reported. The instructions were followed by spaces for writing the three 
memories. Students who had not finished after 10 minutes were instructed to move on to the 
last memory as soon as they had finished the memory they were currently working on.
In the final stage of the procedure, the participants were asked to view a mixture of 
pictures that had and had not been presented during the mood induction stage. The main 
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the affective material. All the participants correctly identified the pictures they had seen and 
the pictures they had not seen during the mood induction stage. When they had finished, the 
participants were thanked and debriefed.
Results
We conducted mediation analyses (one for each mediating variable), 
following Baron and Kenny’s (1986) recommendations. The means and standard 
deviations for both mood measures and for the valence of the autobiographical 
memories for each mood condition are presented in Table 1.
Table 1. Mean scores and standard deviations for EMG activity (μV),
BMIS scores and the valence of the autobiographical memories for each mood condition.
Measures
Negative
M               SD
Mood induction
Neutral
M               SD
Positive
M              SD
(n = 12) (n = 12) (n = 14)
EMG
Corrugator supecilii
Zygomaticus major
Composite score
0.98           0.26
0.67           0.09
–0.31           0.26
0.67           0.21
0.73           0.15
0.06           0.25
0.65           0.07
1.13           0.39
0.48             0.4
BMIS 0               7           9.16           5.95 10.78           5.75
Valence of recall  3.52           1.21 4.42           1.13 4.65           0.94
Effect of mood induction on autobiographical memory recall
In line with the first step of the mediation analysis procedure, we tested 
whether or not mood induction had an effect on the dependent variable, which 
was obtained by calculating the mean score of the three recalled memories for 
each participant. We expected the variations in the valence of the autobiographical 
memories to be congruent with the valence of the mood induction. To test this 
hypothesis, we conducted one-way ANOVAs with two orthogonal contrasts: a 
planned comparison testing the linear model and a contrast testing the remaining 
variance (i.e., the only contrast that should not be significant if the model tested 
fits the data). The test for the planned comparison, which opposed the negative 
and positive mood conditions (negative = –1, neutral = 0, positive = 1), was 
significant,  F(1, 35) = 8.36, p <.006. Importantly, the orthogonal contrast, 
opposing neutral mood condition to both the negative and positive mood 
conditions (negative = 1, neutral = –2, positive = 1), was not significant, F <1. 
As Table 1 shows, the participants in the negative mood condition reported fewer 
positive memories than participants in the neutral mood condition, who, in turn, 
reported less positive memories than participants in the positive mood condition.
Effect of mood inductions on mood indicators
The second condition of the mediation analysis involves an independent 
variable effect on the mediating variable. To test for this condition we separately 
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Mood induction and the BMIS. Participants in the negative mood condition were 
expected to be in a more negative mood than those in the neutral mood condition, 
who, in turn, were expected to be in a more negative mood than participants in 
the positive mood condition. The planned comparison testing the linear model 
was significant, F(1, 35) = 19.34, p <.0001, and the orthogonal contrast testing 
the remaining variance was not significant, F(1, 35) = 3, p <.09. Participants 
in the negative mood condition reported less positive mood than participants 
in the neutral mood condition, who, in turn, reported less positive mood than 
participants in the positive mood condition (Table 1).
Mood inductions and EMG activity. Previous work has shown that corrugator 
supercilii EMG activity can be used to detect negative mood and that zygomaticus 
major EMG activity can be used to detect positive mood (Cacioppo et al., 1986). 
Hence, we expected participants in the negative mood condition to show greater 
corrugator supercilii EMG activity than the participants in the neutral and 
positive mood conditions, for whom the levels of corrugator supercilii EMG 
activity were expected to be similar. To test this hypothesis, we conducted a one-
way ANOVA with two orthogonal contrasts. The planned comparison opposed 
the negative mood condition to both the neutral and positive mood conditions 
(negative = –2, neutral = 1, positive = 1). This test was significant, F(1, 35) 
= 23.1, p <.0001. Importantly, the contrast of the neutral mood condition with 
the positive mood condition (negative = 0, neutral = –1, positive = 1) was not 
significant, F <1. The participants in the negative mood condition demonstrated 
greater corrugator supercilii EMG activity than the participants in the neutral and 
positive mood conditions (Table 1). For zygomaticus major activity, the planned 
comparison used to test our hypothesis opposed the positive mood condition to 
both the neutral and the negative mood conditions (negative = –1, neutral = –1, 
positive = 2). As expected, this test yielded a significant effect, F(1, 35) = 24.1, 
p <.0001, and the contrast between the neutral mood condition and the negative 
mood condition (negative = –1, neutral = 1, positive = 0) was not significant, F 
<1. Thus, the participants in the positive mood condition demonstrated greater 
zygomaticus major EMG activity than the participants in the neutral and negative 
mood conditions (Table 1).
In order to carry out further mediation analysis, we created a single 
physiological indicator of mood for each participant by subtracting the mean 
amplitude of the corrugator supercilii EMG activity from the zygomaticus major 
EMG activity (higher scores indicate more positive mood). The linear planned 
comparison opposing the positive and negative mood conditions was significant, 
F(1, 35) = 40.83, p <.0001, and the orthogonal contrast testing remaining 
variance was not significant (F <1). The participants in the negative mood 
condition had lower composite EMG scores than the participants in the neutral 
mood condition, who had lower composite EMG scores than the participants in 
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Mediation tests
For each mediator (BMIS and composite EMG scores) we tested a 
statistical model that included both the induction effect and the mediator effect. 
For the BMIS, the results indicate that the observed effect of mood induction on 
the valence of autobiographical memories disappeared when the BMIS effect 
was controlled in the same model (β = .13, ns), and the effect of the BMIS score 
on the valence of the autobiographical recall was significant (β = .46, p <.01). 
Similar results were observed when we analyzed the composite EMG score as 
a mediator. The effect of mood induction on the valence of the autobiographical 
recall was no longer significant (β = –.19, ns), whereas the EMG effect on the 
valence of autobiographical recall was significant (β = .80, p <.0001).
DISCUSSION
The purpose of the present study was to test the hypothesis that mood 
underlies the mood congruence effect in autobiographical recall. Unlike many 
previous studies, we did not try to use a mood induction procedure that was 
entirely without semantic content. Our approach involved testing whether or 
not the mood congruence effect used the “affective path”, that is to say, in 
operational terms, whether or not it was mediated by the participants’ mood. 
In line with previous research, we found a congruency between the valence of 
the induced mood and the valence of the autobiographical memories (Blaney, 
1986; Snyder   & White  , 1982). Importantly, as we expected, the effect of 
induced mood on autobiographical recall was mediated by the participants’ 
affective state. Furthermore, this finding was independent of mood indicator. 
In fact, our results showed that both self-report (BMIS) and composite EMG 
scores had an effect on recall in regression models where the induction effect 
was controlled.
Mood effect or semantic priming?
If our findings are consistent with both the associative and the affect as 
information approaches (Bower, 1981; Schwarz, 2001) it would be difficult to 
interpret them in terms of semantic priming. According to the semantic priming 
hypothesis, the mood congruence effect is mediated by the semantic content 
of the induction procedure. However, this hypothesis cannot explain why, as 
our results show, the effect of induction is mediated by mood measures. It 
could be argued that the participants’ verbal responses to the BMIS items were 
contaminated by the content of the IAPS pictures. If this were the case, it would 
mean that the BMIS was merely an indirect measure of the semantic aspects 
activated by the situation: a hypothesis that is disproved by a number of factors. 
For example, the BMIS has been found to be sensitive to mood manipulation 
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(e.g., Niedenthal & Setterlund, 1994). In addition, research has shown that 
working on positive or negative cognitive material plays a role in subsequent 
cognitive tasks, but does not change a participant’s mood as assessed by the 
BMIS (Innes Ker & Niedenthal, 2002). Taken together, these findings suggest 
that the semantic content of the mood induction procedures only has a very 
minor influence on mood as measured by the BMIS. Even if the BMIS were 
influenced by semantic activation, this influence would be so weak as to rule 
out any possibility of complete mediation. Similar results were also obtained 
for the measures of EMG activity, a parameter that is considered to be even less 
affected by the semantic content of the induction procedure.
One could question the generalization of our findings, as we know that our 
population was composed only of female participants. As we already explained, 
by choosing female participants our purpose was to reduce all between subject 
variations except those induced by our manipulations (see also Dimberg & 
Thunberg, 1998). However, these variations, which could come from gender 
differences, were potentially related to the efficacy of mood inductions and 
physiological measurement (i.e., EMG recording) but not to the autobiographical 
recall. In line with this idea, women have been found to be more sensitive to 
mood inductions (Westermann, Spies, Stahl, & Hesse, 1996) and more facially 
expressive than man (Schwartz, Brown  , & Ahern  , 1980) particularly when 
exposed to facial stimuli (Dimberg & Lunquist, 1990). In addition, research 
also suggests that the emotion expressions can be moderated by cultural norms 
(Ekman  , 1993). On the other side, it has been suggested that mood congruence 
in autobiographical recall is a general and well established effect (Blaney, 1986) 
and we don’t know of any research that clearly indicates difference between 
males and females.
Mood effect or experimenter demand?
Another potential explanation for our results is that they are artifacts of 
experimenter demand. Although we used a cover story to divert attention from 
mood manipulation and its relation to the recall task, it could be argued that 
participants exposed to the positive and negative affective stimuli may have 
guessed the purpose of the study and thus simulated their responses in order to 
comply with the experimenter’s hypothesis. This explanation seems plausible, 
as we know that individuals possess lay theories consistent with the mood 
congruence effect (Eich & Macaulay, 2000). Consequently, rather than being 
due to the participants’ affective state, our findings may simply reflect a social 
desirability bias. However, although this explanation could apply to the analysis 
of the BMIS scores, it cannot explain the results obtained using the physiological 
measures. Even if the participants simulated (or mimicked) facial expressions 
when viewing the affective stimuli, the risk of assessing voluntary expressions 
was minimized by the fact that we only took into account the EMG activity 
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CONCLUSION
Our results show that affective state plays a role in the relationship 
between the mood congruence phenomenon and autobiographical recall, and that 
this relationship cannot be entirely explained by semantic priming. Moreover, 
the complete mediation we found between affective state and autobiographical 
recall could be taken to indicate that semantic priming does not play any role in 
the mood congruence effect. However, the null-effect of induction when mood 
is controlled may be the consequence of a lack of statistical power rather than 
an indication of complete mediation (Fritz & MacKinnon, 2007). Furthermore, 
previous research suggests that semantic priming does play a role in the mood 
congruence effect and that cognitive explanations cannot be excluded. Hence, 
it is likely that both cognitive and affective mechanisms are involved. The 
challenge for future research is to identify the respective weight of each of these 
mechanisms in the mood congruence effect.
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